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Invisible Foundations:
Science, Democracy, and Faith among the Pragmatists
Patrick J. Deneen
Princeton University

Today science is almost universally regarded as an ally of democracy. Religion –
once viewed by Tocqueville as the great support of democratic mores, in contrast to the
materialism of then-contemporary atheists who threatened to undermine democratic
commitments – is now viewed by many as antithetical to the openness and provisionality
that marks both science and democracy. As framed by the neo-pragmatist Richard Rorty,
religion is a “conversation-stopper,” the very definition of anti-democratic, anti-scientific
anti- pragmatism.
In this regard, Rorty echoes the sentiments of his philosophic hero, John Dewey.
Long a core feature of the pragmatist agenda, Dewey repeatedly insisted on the
identification of democracy and science. For Dewey, “science, education, and the
democratic cause meet as one,” as he concluded in a 1944 essay entitled “Democratic
Faith and Education.”1 This sentiment could serve as a capstone to his lifelong belief that
science and democracy were largely equivalent in “methodology” inasmuch as both were
animated by a spirit of investigation, constant reconsideration and revision, and a
practical orientation toward solving discrete problems. More than such methodological
similarities, however, for Dewey each project was imbued with the spirit of religion, now
transferred from the Churches to scientific and democratic activities. “It is the part of
men,” Dewey wrote in 1908, “to labor persistently and patiently for the clarification and
development of the positive creed of life implicit in democracy and in science, and to
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work for the transformation of all practical instrumentalities of education till they are in
harmony with these ideas.” Those “habits of mind” that he saw as essential in this
mutually supportive pursuit of science and democracy through education were, above all,
“honesty, courage, sobriety, and faith.”2
Notwithstanding Dewey’s linking of science and democracy as objects of a new
“common faith,” religion and science are famously, or infamously, perceived as dire
antagonists, locked in eternal battle for the minds and souls of believers. From antiquity
– in which, as some have argued, there was a movement from muthos to logos – to
Galileo’s forced recantation before the Pope in 1634, to the more familiar battles of
modernity such as the 1925 Scopes “monkey trial” and contemporary battles over
scientific and religious pedagogy, religion and science have been posed as dire and often
fatal enemies.3 Religion, based on faith, is regarded as the pure opposite of Science,
which rests on skepticism, hypothesis and provisional proof.
However, it has been also long observed that science itself rests on a form of
faith, a “metaphysical” foundation that pre-supposes a certain order in the universe, that
presumes human intelligence to be uniquely capable of discerning that order, and that
contains an implicit assumption about the inevitability of progress in knowledge and,
ultimately, for humankind generally.4 Above all, if most implicitly, modern science in its
earliest conception rests on the assumption that its findings will be largely benign for
human beings, both in its theoretical implications and in its practical applications,
resulting in the prospect and realization of the “relief of man’s estate.” The earliest
formulations of the scientific project attest that the heavens themselves intend for
mankind to pursue this theoretical and applied scientific enterprise, even if the existence
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of belief in the heavens is potentially shaken or displaced in the process, since heaven
ultimately intends improvement in the human condition, liberation from drudgery, and
human dominion of nature.5 Eventually, scientific faith becomes explicitly linked to
democratic faith by some prominent thinkers who see a link between the ends of the two
toward individual liberation, improvements to human condition that come to resemble the
human intervention in accelerating evolution, and ultimately the creation of the “kingdom
of God,” or heaven, on earth.
Often framed in the language of myth and invoking religious imagery and
theological language, early proponents of the scientific enterprise sought to reformulate
the conception of the “religious” away from the Augustinian or Calvinist belief in human
depravity and the irredeemable nature of earthly domain. As such, scientific proponents
sought to replace such perceived pessimistic beliefs with more optimistic faith in the
prospects for human and natural amelioration by means of human endeavor and
investigation, and ultimately the harnessing, manipulation, improvement, and even
conquest of nature. Instead of posing this new (or, for some, renewed) enterprise of
scientific inquiry as antithetical to religion, many prominent thinkers promoted scientific
inquiry as a form of worship, a method of inquiry that sought to divulge God’s presence
in the world, and ultimately as an endeavor that would yield practical benefits which
themselves would permit human ascent toward the status of divinity. This enterprise was
viewed as both demanded and sanctioned by God – a practice undertaken out of piety
rather than apostasy.6
David Noble has persuasively demonstrated the millenarian influence in the
development of this “religion of technology,” beginning with the controversial abbot

4
Joachim of Fiore in the thirteenth century and uncovering continuities through
subsequent centuries in the thought of such figures as Roger Bacon, Giordano Bruno,
Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle, the “Cambridge Platonists,” Isaac Newton, and in the more
secularized thought of the Freemasons, Karl Marx, and, in America, in such thinkers as
Edward Bellamy.7

Noble contends that contemporary scientific projects, such as space

exploration, artificial intelligence, and the rise of genetic engineering, while “masked by
a secular vocabulary,” are in fact actually “medieval in its origin and spirit.”8 While
longstanding religious doctrine held that humanity was created in the image of God and
that, following Genesis, God granted humanity dominion over the earth and its creatures,
following Augustinian influence these teachings did not mitigate belief in the
fundamental imperfection of humanity stemming from the Fall and the primary role as
“caretaker” amid nature rather than one who stood apart from nature.9 The millenarian
tradition, however, departed radically from these teachings, arguing that man’s fallen
nature was a temporary condition and that through his own efforts he could recapture not
only the state of innocence, but by means of reading and manipulating the “text” of
nature itself, man could actually achieve a form of divinity. A representative statement is
articulated by Giordano Bruno at the end of the sixteenth-century, who stated that such
effort, in copying the creative activities of God, is sanctioned and ordained by God:
Providence has decreed that man should be occupied in action by the
hands and in contemplation by the intellect, but in such a way that he may
not contemplate without action or work without contemplation. [And
thus] through emulation of the actions of God and under the direction of
spiritual impulse [men] sharpened their wits, invented industries and
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discovered art. And always, from day to day, by force of necessity, from
the depths of the human mind rose new and wonderful inventions. By this
means, separating themselves more and more from their animal natures by
their busy and zealous employment, they climbed nearer the divine
being.10
The millenarian and proto-scientific tradition – one that increasingly understood
human activity as itself the necessary component to bring about the kingdom of God on
earth – repeatedly emphasized three beliefs that constitute the “religion of technology”:
first, the belief in progress; second, the ideal of human self-transformation; and third, the
aspiration of human ascension to godliness. Each of these ends was to be achieved by
means of mastery of “natural philosophy,” the forerunner of science. If the story of the
Fall had previously been understood to define strict limits on human aspirations and to
deny the possibility of human perfectibility, millenarian interpretations increasingly
understood the story of Adam’s transgression to portray a temporary condition of
ignorance that could be reversed by means of the development of human knowledge and
applications of inventions and discoveries.11 Progress was thus, in effect, a process of
“rediscovery” of what mankind had lost at its point of origin, but this second time not as
an unearned gift from God’s hand, but a divinely sanctioned result of human inquiry into
God’s creation. Reflecting this renewed confidence in human perfectibility was John
Milton, who surmised that “when the cycle of universal knowledge has been completed,
still the spirit will be restless in our dark imprisonment here, and it will rove about until
the bounds of creation itself no longer limit the divine magnificence of its quest…. Truly
[man] will seem to have the stars under his control and dominion, land and sea at his
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command, and the winds and storms submissive to his will. Mother Nature herself has
surrendered to him. It is as if some god had abdicated the government of the world and
committed its justice, laws, and administration to him as ruler.”12
Among the earliest and most celebrated calls for the prospects of near-infinite
human self-improvement was Pico della Mirandola’s 1486 “Oration on the Dignity of
Man” which evinces this tripartite belief in progress, self-transformation and the
possibility of humanity ascending to divinity by means of science. Evoking a version of
the Prometheus myth as purportedly related by Protagoras in Plato’s dialogue
Protagoras, Pico at once “updates” the ancient tale for a Christian audience and
transforms the Biblical story of creation as told in Genesis into one in which human
beings avoid the Fall and further become defined by a very absence of fixed properties.
God creates humankind as an afterthought, having fashioned all of existence but without
any creature that could “ponder the plan of so great a work, to love its beauty, and to
wonder at its vastness.”13 Since He had not initially planned to create mankind, God has
already exhausted all of the “archetypes” and there exists no model remaining in his
“treasure-houses” upon which to base this new creature. “All was now complete; all
things had been assigned to the highest, the middle, and the lowest orders.”14
While Pico’s portrayal of Divine oversight and limitation here runs the risk of
blasphemy, he moves to affirm God’s limitless powers of creation by describing the
fashioning of a creature without fixed qualities or talents:
He therefore took man as a creature of indeterminate nature and, assigning
him a place in the middle of the world, addressed him thus: “Neither fixed
abode nor a form that is thine alone nor any function peculiar to thyself
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have we given the, Adam, to the end that according to thy longing and
according to thy judgment thou mayest have and possess what abode and
what functions thou thyself desire. The nature of all other beings is
limited and constrained within the bounds of laws prescribed by Us.
Thou, constrained by no limits, in accordance with thine own free will, in
whose hand We have placed thee, shalt ordain for thyself the limits of thy
nature. We have set thee at the world’s center that thou mayest from
thence more easily observe whatever is in the world. We have made thee
neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, so that with
freedom of choice and with honor, as though the maker and molder of
thyself, thou mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape thou shalt prefer.
Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life,
which are brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul’s judgment,
to be reborn into the higher forms, which are divine. 15
Because of this unique and singular origin and destiny, humans exist at a “rank to
be envied not only by brutes but even by the stars and by minds beyond this world.”16
Combined with his portrayal of God as limited to creating based on pre-existing
“archetypes” to which He cannot add (thus having only recourse to the fashioning of
humans without qualities), this conception of humanity as entirely self-creating hints at a
curious displacement and reversal of the divine and the human: God “creates” humanity
to be self-creating, even “self-transforming,” potentially growing into “a heavenly being”
(if rational), “an angel and the son of God” (if intellectual), or one that “made one with
God … shall surpass them all (if withdrawn “into the center of his own unity”).”17 God is
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constrained in his creation of humanity by the prior existence of uncreated “archetypes,”
indicating a curiously limited deity who nevertheless negotiates these limits by means of
the creation of a creature that does not appear, in the end, to be so limited. If God’s limits
force him to create mankind as a creature without qualities, humanity in turn becomes a
creature who creates, one that can even make itself into a divine being – something that
God could not do, since the divine is itself uncreated, whereas humans are not limited to
those same prior “archetypes.”
While the necessity and these powers of self-creation come initially from God,
they can only be exercised and realized by humans. God intends for human beings to
make as much of themselves as they can – even to the point of transforming themselves
into divine beings. Thus, God sanctions and blesses human attempts at self-perfection.
Pico makes this clear in his call for humanity to embrace “natural philosophy,” the
philosophical investigation of natural phenomenon. Despite leaving mankind without
qualities, God gives to humanity the script by means which it can avoid a descent into
depravity and instead attain a divine condition. Distinguishing a laudable form of
“magic” from a form of deceptive conjuring (Pico praises the magus who is “the servant
of nature and not a contriver”18), he describes how the magus can become “ruler and
lord” by “calling forth into the light as if from their hiding-places the powers scattered
and sown in the world by the loving-kindness of God,” and thus “does not so much work
wonders as diligently serve a wonder-working nature.” This investigator “brings forth
into the open the miracles concealed in the recesses of the world, in the depths of nature,
and in the storehouses and the mysteries of God, just as if she herself were their maker;
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and, as the farmer weds the elms to vines, even does the magus wed earth to heaven, that
is, he weds lower things to the endowments and powers of higher things.”19
This knowledge is not, however, the result of superficial investigation into the
natural world. Rather, by undertaking to discern God’s mysteries hidden throughout the
earth and the heavens, finally to “wed earth to heaven,” mankind ascends to a godlike
status.
Once we have achieved this by the art of discourse and reasoning, then,
inspired by the Cherubic spirit, using philosophy through the steps of the
ladder, that is, of nature, and penetrating all things from center to center,
we shall descend, with titanic force rending the unity like Osiris into many
parts, and we shall sometimes ascend, with the force of Phoebus collecting
the parts like the limbs of Osiris into a unity, until, resting at last in the
bosom of the Father who is above the ladder, we shall be made perfect
with the felicity of theology.20
Human perfectibility is within its own power, achieved by means of “reading” and
interpreting the text of nature wherein lie hidden God’s hints of how to achieve a kind of
divinity. If “theology” is needed to achieve final perfection, Pico suggests throughout
that the most pious form of inquiry – the one intended by God at the time of humanity’s
creation – is the effort to understand divine intention through the scientific investigation
of nature.
Pico’s emphasis on God’s hidden mysteries and the role of humanity in exposing
and exploiting those clues is echoed in Francis Bacon’s frequent invocation of Proverbs
25:2, “It is the glory of God to conceal a thing: but the honor of kings to search out the
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matter.”21 While Bacon’s work is often cited for its influence in the modern belief in
progress – especially the progress achieved by means of a scientific enterprise dedicated
to the “benefit and use of men” – less often perceived are Bacon’s accompanying belief
in the possibility of human transformation by means of scientific advancement, and
ultimately the prospect of him “similitude” to the status of the Divine.22 If Bacon is
regarded as the progenitor of the secular modern scientific project, it is no less true that
he perceived that project’s secular aims to be wholly in keeping with divine strictures and
ultimately undertaken under divine sanction and with an end to the greater glory of God
and the ultimate deification of humanity.
Echoing the belief of many millenarians, Bacon rejected the suggestion that
mankind’s fall from Eden indicated that human inquiry was forbidden or discouraged, but
in a spirit of piety concluded that such inquiry should not be undertaken as an effort to
displace God. Bacon distinguished between rightful form of human dominion in the
earthly realm and the illegitimate attempt by mankind to free itself altogether from God’s
commandments.23 Inquiry is to be limited by this outer boundary, to be undertaken at all
times with piety and obeisance to divine majesty. Thus, Bacon writes, “all knowledge is
to be limited by religion….”24
Yet these strictures are not as limiting as they might first appear. In Valerius
Terminus or “Of the Interpretation of Nature” – an early fragmentary work, believed to
have been written in 1603 in preparation for The Advancement of Learning – Bacon
argued that mankind in Eden, like the rebelling angels, had sought to “ascend and be like
unto the Highest,” and instructively adds, “not God, but the highest.”25 The transgression
of Lucifer and the angels, like the transgression of Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden,
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was to seek to become higher than God rather than seeking to be like God. While the
attempt to gain “knowledge of good and evil” intruded into “God’s secrets and
mysteries,” Adam’s dominion over nature before the Fall – indicated especially by his
naming of the animals – revealed that inquiry and knowledge was the proper provenance
of prelapsarian humankind.26 Bacon concludes that, “as to the goodness of God, there is
no danger in contending or advancing towards a similitude thereof, as that which is open
and propounded to our imitation.”27
The “limitation” demanded by religion on scientific inquiry is revealed essentially
to present no limitation at all. Piety requires thorough human investigation and
harnessing of all natural phenomena: “For that nothing parcel of the world is denied to
man’s inquiry and invention….”28 “Heaven and earth do conspire and contribute to the
use and benefit of man,” Bacon insisted, pointing to a confluence of sacred and secular
grounds for the pursuit of knowledge.29 Divine scripture “invite[s] us to consider and to
magnify the great and wonderful works of God,” an acknowledgement which leads
Bacon to admonish his readers that “religion should dearly protect all increase of natural
knowledge.”30
By means of properly pursuing the advancement of learning – not in the manner
of Adam in precipitating the Fall by seeking the knowledge of good and evil, but rather in
the manner of Adam prior to the Fall – mankind could hope to reverse the consequences
of the Fall. Through investigation and artifice mankind could re-achieve what was once
its divine inheritance, and by means of inquiry it might restore the prelapsarian condition
of plenitude, ease, peace, and even immortality.31 The pursuit of this rightful form of
inquiry could be expected to lead to
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a restitution and reinvesting (in great part) of man to the sovereignty and
power (for whensoever he shall be able to call the creatures by their true
names he shall again command them) which he had in his first state of
creation. And to speak plainly and clearly, it is a discovery of all
operations and possibilities of operations from immortality (if it were
possible) to the meanest mechanical practice.32
Beyond those desirable if still “vulgar” ends of knowledge – which include “imperial and
military virtue” as well as “power and commandment” over other humans – is the most
sublime and final end of knowledge: by means of learning, “man ascendeth to the
heavens” and achieves that to which “man’s nature doth most aspire, which is
immortality or continuance.”33
Bacon unveils his confidence in human mastery of the universe, even beyond that
of God, perhaps most suggestively, if subtly, in his re-telling and interpretation of the
myth of Prometheus in The Wisdom of the Ancients. Deploying the same tactic as
Protagoras and Pico della Mirandola before him, and Percy Bysshe Shelley after him, the
Promethean myth provides fertile ground in which to “rediscover” mankind’s powers and
restore human optimism of its central place in the natural and even divine order. While
retaining enough elements of the tale to appear faithful to the original myth, Bacon in fact
alters several familiar elements in order to permit an interpretation that is most
sympathetic to mankind’s capacity and points to the possibility of human transformation
and even exhaltation over the divine.
“Prometheus, or the State of Man (Explained of an overruling Providence, and of
Human Nature)” is the longest of Bacon’s thirty-one retellings of classic myths in The
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Wisdom of the Ancients. Bacon had cause to wish to call attention to the essay, for it is a
subtly crafted exposition of humanity’s place in the natural and divine order, and further,
an exhortation for humanity to improve its position within that order (thus, to that extent,
it resembles in more than subject matter Pico’s “Oration”). As in the versions by
Protagoras and Pico, Bacon relates that Prometheus created humanity and at some point
he stole fire from the gods and gave it to humanity. At this point, however, Bacon
departs from known versions of the myth: mankind responds to this gift with ingratitude,
and arranges for Prometheus to be tried by Jupiter. Curiously, Jupiter is delighted with
humanity’s efforts to prosecute Prometheus and by their possession of fire, and extends to
them perpetual youth. Humanity foolishly gives away the latter gift to an ass, who then
subsequently gives it to the race of serpents. Nevertheless (according to Bacon),
Prometheus continues his “unwarrantable practices” (rather than, as the classic myth had
it, protecting humanity) by deceiving Jupiter into choosing an unworthy sacrifice, and for
his deception he provokes Jupiter to fashion a punishment against humanity in the form
of Pandora and a box of curses. Prometheus is also bound in chains to the side of a
mountain where a vulture daily consumes his liver, and is released from this punishment
only when Hercules sails by upon the ocean, shoots the bird and sets Prometheus free.34
In his explanation, Bacon varies his account of the symbolic meaning of
Prometheus, but at the outset he states that “Prometheus clearly and expressly signifies
Providence.”35 By “providence” Bacon seems to suggest that Prometheus symbolizes
mankind’s divinely-ordained destiny, the repository of God’s plans for the universe (thus,
he writes, “providence is implanted in the human mind in conformity with, and by the
direction and the design of the greater overruling Providence”36). The “principal” ground
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for understanding Prometheus to signify Providence is because “man seems to be the
thing in which the whole world centers, with respect to final causes” as explained at
length by Bacon:
So that if he [i.e.,mankind] were away, all other things would stray and
fluctuate, without end or intention, or become perfectly disjointed, and out
of frame; for all things are made subservient to man, and he receives use
and benefit from them all. Thus the revolutions, places, and periods, of
the celestial bodies, serve him for distinguishing times and seasons, and
for dividing the world into different regions; the meteors afford him
prognostications of the weather; the winds sail our ships, drive our mills,
and move our machines; and the vegetables and animals of all kinds
either afford us matter for houses and habitations, clothing, food, physic;
or tend to ease, or delight, to support, or to refresh us so that everything in
nature seems not made for itself, but for man.37
Prometheus, qua Providence, would appear to be a worthy object of human
gratitude and praise for this bounty of natural provisions and human dominion, but Bacon
here surprises with his interpretation of his own departure from the traditional tale, in
which, as Bacon relates, Prometheus receives instead ingratitude from humanity for his
gifts. Calling it “a remarkable part of the fable” (which, clearly, it is, inasmuch as Bacon
himself fashioned it), he recognizes that “it may seem strange that the sin of ingratitude to
a creator and benefactor, a sin so heinous as to include almost all others, should meet
with approbation and reward.”38 However, Bacon asserts that the fable teaches its
perceptive readers that such ingratitude “proceeds from a most noble and laudable temper
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of the mind,” namely that those “who arraign and accuse both nature and art, and are
always full of complaints against them … are perpetually stirred up to fresh industry and
new discoveries.”39 By contrast, those who stand in awe of humanity’s place in the
universe – and express gratitude for this position – are in fact subject to think themselves
satisfied with their current state, and “rest, without further inquiry.” This latter condition,
Bacon avers, shows “little regard to the divine nature.”40
In his interpretation of the preceding passage, Bacon subtly shifts the ground from
his initial identification of Prometheus with “Providence” that directs mankind – a
providence that affords men “mind and understanding”41 – to one in which such
providence is itself subject to a strenuous and accusatory form of human inquiry that it
afforded in the first instance. Ingratitude only appears at first glance to be a sin: in fact,
ingratitude – whether to “a creator and benefactor” (which only appears “heinous”), or to
“nature and art” (which is praiseworthy) – in both cases is curiously sanctioned and
ultimately rewarded by “the divine nature.” Echoing Pico’s treatment, Bacon suggests
that humanity is providentially given the necessary tools by which to “arraign and
accuse” Providence, and can expect to be rewarded for these exertions by a higher power
– even to receive the gift of immortality. Humanity has only unsuccessfully pursued the
possibility of immortality due to impatience and unnecessary abstraction, but it is now
within its reach – having now the example of the ancients both to emulate and to improve
upon – to become, like the patient ass, “a useful bearer of a new and accumulated divine
bounty to mankind.”42
As if to constrain the impious implications of his analysis, Bacon concludes with
an interpretation of that section of the myth in which punishment is inflicted daily upon
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Prometheus by an eagle, suggesting that this image affords a warning against
overweening and impious inquiries. “The meaning seems to be this,” Bacon writes, “that
when men are puffed up with arts and knowledge, they often try to subdue even the
divine wisdom and bring it under the dominion of sense and reason, whence inevitably
follows a perpetual and restless rending and tearing of the mind. A sober and humble
distinction must, therefore, be made betwixt divine and human things, and betwixt the
oracles of sense and faith….”43 Almost unnoticeably, Bacon has replaced his initial
interpretation identifying Prometheus with “Providence” with one that identifies
Prometheus with humanity. Yet, it is a subtle transformation that has in fact been
effected by means of the preceding “explanation” of the need to use the gifts of
providence to interrogate providence, and effectively make one’s own new kind of
“providence” by means of those gifts. If humanity, in effect, makes itself into its own
providential agent, then it now stands no longer at odds with Prometheus, but instead
against Zeus – the implied “higher power” that stands even above Providence. Bacon’s
warning seems to be, lest we tempt the kind of punishment visited upon Prometheus by
Zeus – that daily “rending and tearing” – we must humbly acknowledge the distinction
between “divine and human things.”
That might conclude matters but for the highly curious interpretive passage that
has preceded this explanation of Prometheus’ punishment which, in the original fable
related by Bacon, in fact follows the description of the Prometheus’ daily torture. Bacon
interprets the freeing of Prometheus before his interpretation of the punishment.44 Thus,
though his explanation precedes this apparently final warning about the need for human
piety, in fact the prior interpretation of Hercules’ role in Prometheus’ liberation is the
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“final” lesson of the allegory in spite of its penultimate placement in the interpretation.
As for the role of Hercules, Bacon writes
even Prometheus had not the power to free himself, but owed his
deliverance to another; for no natural inbred force and fortitude could
prove equal to such a task. The power of releasing him came from the
utmost confines of the ocean, and from the sun; that is, from Apollo, or
knowledge…. Accordingly, Virgil … account[s] him happy who knows
the cause of things, and has conquered all his fears, apprehensions, and
superstitions.45
Curiously, Prometheus – who had provided humanity with the capacity to forge his own
inquiries, even to the point of “arraigning” Prometheus, or “Providence” – does not now
possess the abilities to free himself. He has not conquered all of his fears – fears that he
has not hitherto evinced in his willingness to combat Zeus – suggesting that his final fear
is his unwillingness to possess the power that would forestall his punishment (or
superstitious fear of punishment) and make his liberation at the hands of another
unnecessary. Hercules represents the fearless scientist or discoverer – he who “supports
and confirms the human mind” – who finally liberates the now humanized Prometheus
from his final “fears, apprehensions and superstitions.” The prospect of liberation at the
hands of Hercules makes the fear of Zeus superfluous and apprehension of punishment
nugatory, since, by emulating Hercules, humanity has no fear of any external form of
bondage given that it possesses of all the means of self-liberation. The final statement on
the significance of Hercules – and hence, of the parable itself – confirms that human
transformation and ascendance to the status of human divinity is the true object of
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Bacon’s teaching: “as if, through the narrowness of our nature, or too great a fragility
thereof, we were absolutely incapable of that fortitude and constancy to which Seneca
finely alludes, when he says: ‘It is a noble thing, at once to participate in the frailty of
man and the security of a god.’”46 Bacon sought to remake humanity, by means of the
advancement of learning and its resulting aim at “the glory of the Creator and the relief of
man’s estate,” allowing humanity to achieve their due status, “not animals on their hind
legs, but mortal gods.”47
Bacon may be a curious and objectionable imputed background source for the
eventual identification between advances in science and democracy, especially given that
Bacon was a committed monarchist and frequently recommended secrecy in political
matters.48 Yet Bacon advances arguments on behalf of the scientific enterprise that are
easily assimilated to democratic ends, and indeed, may even lead logically and
necessarily in that direction – a trajectory of which Bacon, in several moments, appeared
himself to be well aware.
There is, of course, a potential tension between the scientific enterprise which
emphasizes the role of expertise and elite knowledge, and democracy’s expectation of the
basic competence among, and widespread participation of, the citizenry. Even the most
fervent democrats have recognized that informed elites play a role in the cultivation of
intelligence and judgment among the populace. John Dewey, for example, readily
recognized that “for most men, save the scientific workers, science is a mystery in the
hands of initiates….”49 Modern democracy requires sufficient knowledge of complex
issues, requiring not only the means of communication that adequately disseminate
information and knowledge, but adequately developed individual understanding of
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methods of inquiry and analysis. For Dewey, modern America had successfully achieved
the former, but was woefully insufficient in development of the latter. Answering Walter
Lippmann’s questioning of the political competency of the ordinary person, Dewey called
for the “artful” presentation of the latest advances in scientific inquiry, likening the
successful dissemination of knowledge of “enormous and widespread human bearing” to
enticing forms of literary presentation. By means of such artistically rendered
knowledge, Dewey believed that the creation of a “Great Community” was possible, one
composed of “an organized, articulate Public.” Here Dewey acknowledges the central
role not of a scientist or inventor, but to democracy’s “seer,” Walt Whitman. He
concluded that democracy would achieve a consummation when “free social inquiry is
indissolubly wedded to the art of full and moving communication.”50
In both these respects Bacon anticipates this “wedding” of scientific inquiry and
democracy, particularly by linking the method of scientific inquiry to the concomitant
amelioration of the human condition, brought about by the resultant practical applications
and devices that would expand opportunities for leisure and universal communication. In
several instances Bacon emphasized how his recommended form of scientific inquiry is
based upon, and substantively promotes, a kind of equality. Denying that the scientific
enterprise calls for a kind of specialized and elite knowledge, in the Novum Organum
Bacon asserted that the form of inquiry he recommended was universally accessible:
My method of scientific discovery leaves only a small role to sharpness
and power of wits, but puts all wits and understandings more or less on a
level. For just as drawing a straight line or a perfect circle simply by hand
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calls for a very steady and practiced hand, but little or no skill if a ruler or
pair of compasses is used, so it is with my method.51
Bacon thus suggested that his method advances two forms of equality – one that is
intrinsic to the method itself (“puts all wits and understandings more or less on a level”),
and the other that is the result of practical applications deriving from the successful
inquiry into natural causes (“little or no skill [is required] if a ruler or pair of compasses
is used”).
Bacon was keenly aware of the egalitarian, and even democratic, implications of
the methodology itself. As he stated early in his writings, “howsoever governments have
several forms, sometimes one governing, sometimes few, sometimes the multitude; yet
the state of knowledge is ever a Democratie, and that prevaileth which is most agreeable
to the senses and conceits of the people.”52 In seeking to employ the method of scientific
inquiry – one that “puts all wits and understandings more or less on a level” – the
expected result is the discovery of new applications that lighten the burdens of humanity,
increase longevity, and promote social intercourse between citizens and people of varying
nations. Writing in theNew Atlantis about the final aim of the “Salomon’s House,” or
“The College of Six Days,” Bacon wrote that “the End of our Foundation is the
knowledge of Causes, and the secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds
of Human Empire, to the effecting of all things possible.”53 The discovery of “secret
motions” and subsequent inventions that improve upon nature’s bounty allows for the
increased likelihood of practical human equality – such as the universal capacity offered
by the “compass,” when previously only a skilled hand could draw a perfect circle. Both
the method of scientific inquiry, and its resultant applications, point to a democratic
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trajectory that was perceived even by Bacon, and became readily apparent to full-blown
democratic faithful.
Dewey, for instance, spared no praise for Bacon, calling him “the forerunner of
the spirit of modern life,” the “real founder of modern thought,” and “the prophet of a
pragmatic conception of knowledge.”54 In particular Dewey praised three aspects of
Bacon’s practical philosophy: first, his insistence that “knowledge is power,” or that true
knowledge leads to human empowerment over natural phenomena; second, his “sense of
progress as the aim and test of genuine knowledge,” the continual amelioration of the
human condition by means of unceasing investigation and interrogation of nature; and
third, his insight that led to the perfection of the inductive method of experimentation,
one that stressed activity and the constant “invasion of the unknown” based on the
rejection of certainty and the embrace of ever-constant doubt.55 In The Public and Its
Problems, Dewey articulated how this approach to human knowledge – one that aimed at
practical amelioration of conditions as well as expanding circles of knowledge
throughout the citizenry – was the essence of democratic life. Beyond mere suffrage or
distant oversight over the activity of its representatives, active and universal inquiry and
amelioration was the basis of a true democracy. In this sense, Dewey averred, “the cure
for the ailments of democracy is more democracy.”56 If Bacon did not see the full
implications of his own analysis, never “discovered the land of promise,” Dewey insists
that “he proclaimed the new goal and by faith he descried its features from afar.”57
One sees the final aim of Baconian science in its original conception – namely,
the transformation of humanity – continue to be articulated among proponents of
democracy, but often in less overtly religious tones as those employed by Bacon. Indeed,
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ironically, due to the intervening history in which religion has been perceived to be more
hostile than friendly toward the scientific enterprise, defenders of the scientific faith have
advanced claims to human transformation as a prospect in spite of, and antithetical to,
traditional religious belief.58 Richard Rorty captures the dual religious and anti-religious
sense of this belief in the transformative powers of humanity by means of the interlinking
of science – as the means of “relieving the human estate” – and democracy:
In past ages of the world, things were so bad that “a reason to believe, a
way of to take the world by the throat” was hard to get except by looking
to a power not ourselves. In those days, there was little choice but to
sacrifice the intellect in order to grasp hold of the premises of practical
syllogisms – premises concerning the after-death consequences of
baptism, pilgrimage or participation in holy wars. To be imaginative and
to be religious, in those dark times, came to almost the same thing – for
this world was too wretched to lift up the heart. But things are different
now, because of human beings’ gradual success in making their lives, and
their world, less wretched. Nonreligious forms of romance have
flourished – if only in those lucky parts of the world where wealth, leisure,
literacy, and democracy have worked together to prolong our lives and fill
our libraries.59
For Rorty, the opportunities afforded by these contemporary advances – ones that he
frequently and gratefully attributes to Bacon’s proto-pragmatic arguments in favor of
“knowledge as power”60 – allow now for us to be “carried beyond presently used
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language.”61 Humanity transforms itself by means of new uses and employment of
language, according to Rorty’s admonition of “liberal irony.”62
For all the confidence in the prospect of democratic consummation and human
transformation afforded by the modern scientific enterprise as expressed by such
optimistic thinkers as Dewey and Rorty, there has persisted the misgiving that the
scientific project may not be as seamlessly supportive of democracy’s aims as might be
hoped by the most faithful devotees. One only needs consider those social scientists of
the early twentieth-century – such as 1934’s A.P.S.A. President Walter Shepard, whose
scientific conclusions prompted him to call for a thorough reconsideration and revision of
the prevailing “democratic faith” – to perceive the source of continued misgivings about
the relationship between the scientific enterprise and democracy. To the extent that each
rests on a kind of faith in a better future, however, it is not surprising to find testaments of
faith that endorse, promote, and even proselytize on behalf of a strengthened faith in the
shared aims of science and democracy.63
One noteworthy document that affirms a firm connection between democracy and
the ends of science (as against the more suspect forms of religious faith) is the
Proceedings of a conference held in New York City in May, 1943, entitled The Scientific
Spirit and Democratic Faith.64 Organized in part to combat the threat posed by the
“closed society” of fascism, as well as to repudiate perceived authoritarian leanings of
religious organizations within liberal democratic societies, the conference gathered
together both prominent democratic theorists – such as Horace M. Kallen – as well as
practicing scientists of different stripes, all with a common ambition to argue on behalf of
“an essential interrelation” between science and democracy.65 Most remarkable about the
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document is the extent to which the tension that the conference sought implicitly to dispel
– the fear that the scientific project and democracy may not be altogether compatible
enterprises – was in fact deepened by a curious disconnection between the vision of the
conference’s democratic theorists and its scientists. One might suspect that the
conference’s participants became anxious as the conference unfolded; yet, amid the
shared optimism over the strong linkage of science and democracy, there was an absence
of reflection upon the implications of the proceedings, and no self-conscious notes of
caution during the conference.
Infused with the spirit of pragmatism – one of the organizers explicitly states that
the participants were “radical democrats” in the spirit of Emerson and belonged to the
American philosophic tradition of William James and John Dewey – the papers of the
first half of the volume strongly assert the essential connection between the freedom of
inquiry required by science and the condition of open and ranging freedom that defines
democratic politics at large.66 Echoing Dewey, as well as the more distant echoes that
Dewey attributed to Bacon, the organizers set forth several guiding principles of the
conference, including the following:
•

The scientific spirit is in essence the modern search for truth;

•

The democratic faith is in essence the belief that human resources may
become adequate for human needs wherever freedom of inquiry exists
and cooperative techniques are developed

•

The scientific spirit is dependent upon the democratic faith in the sense
that science cannot develop into an instrument for human welfare
except in an atmosphere of freedom.67
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Science requires democracy in order to fully engage in the search for truth without
obstruction from authoritarian sources; democracy requires science to the extent that
citizens must be afforded every opportunity for material advancement, as well as
equipped with the tools of discernment provided by scientific inquiry, ultimately with an
aim to making them capable of thinking and interacting by employing the same
methodological approach as scientists. Thus, another principle affirmed by the
conference holds that “when the democratic faith becomes practice the resulting process
is one in which all policy-making is an affair of participation. Policies which need to be
‘lived out,’ decisions which seek to represent the experience of the people, must be
derived from the participating knowledge and experience of the people.”68
Horace M. Kallen echoes these principles in his spirited attack on
authoritarianism and a defense of the scientific enterprise and its essential connection to
the democratic faith. Like democracy, science thrives on free inquiry and implies the
equality of all reasonable participants:
The sciences are preeminently the fields of free thought. No idea, no
hypothesis, no technique that they consider is admitted to a privileged
status. None is exempt from the competition of alternatives. None is
denied the cooperation of its competitors in the tests of its validity. None
enters the field as a truth revealed, self-evident, beyond the challenge of
doubt, beyond the proofs of inquiry.69
For Kallen, as for Dewey, the phrases “scientific spirit” and “democratic faith” overlap to
the point of being indistinguishable: both “convey an identical attitude in different but
interacting undertakings of the human enterprise.”70 From the anti-foundational,
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pragmatic point of view, all certainties – whether in natural sciences or politics – are in
fact merely apparent, and must be subject to revision and potential rejection by unceasing
inquiry and investigation. All beliefs are provisional, and “faiths” that maintain
certainties are to be exposed and dismissed as forms of “spiritual fascism.”71 Kallen’s
certainty on the progressive nature of uncertainty derives from his democratic faith, the
belief that open inquiry in the political and scientific realms will be forever mutually
supportive in improving humanity’s condition, and that all democratic citizens can be
brought to a level of sufficient sophistication and interest to employ the methods of
science in their own formulations of public policy.
This belief was fully shared by the practicing scientists who participated in the
conference, several of whom strongly endorsed this “democratic faith” and who viewed
the full flourishing of science as affording the opportunity to move humanity to a
condition that would justify this initial faith in their universal capacities. One scientist –
Alfred Mirsky, an Associate Member of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research –
distinguished between “those people who do not have the democratic faith” and thus who
shared “a very low opinion of human nature” (here quoting, as an example, Alexander
Hamilton), and those people “who do have the democratic faith” made possible by a
“more optimistic point of view towards human nature.”72
To demonstrate that this more “optimistic” faith in humanity is warranted, Mirsky
launched into a lengthy analogy drawn from his close experience with laboratory rats.
He noted that rats which are ill-treated – kept in dirty cages and not fed or handled
sufficiently – are wild and uncontrollable. By contrast, those rats that are kept clean and
well-fed are mild and gentle. “Petting” and encouraging laboratory rats become
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accustomed to their “caretakers” is essential in this process of “gentling.”73 To further
demonstrate his point, he described that ill-treated rats died with high frequency with the
removal of the parathyroid gland, whereas “gentled” rats survived the operation at a
much higher rates. Mirsky concluded that this comparison revealed the central
importance of conditioning and pointed to its promise in the realm of genetic
experimentation. In his peroration, he drew an explicit comparison between the more
docile manner and better physical health of well-treated rats to human beings, calling for
humans to be treated in a similar manner: “I think we know enough to say that if man
were treated the way these rats have been in the laboratory, then … there are good
grounds for the democratic faith; in other words, for the faith that there are some good
potentialities in ordinary human beings.”74 While one can hardly gainsay the benefits of
greater health – particularly necessary for laboratory animals in order to survive
experimental surgery (a point which gives pause when Mirsky opines that “man should
be studied in laboratories much more than he is”) – one wonders if “gentling” is the
highest democratic virtue that science can offer to humanity, and whether those purported
“democratic” virtues of unceasing inquiry and participation – emphasized in the volume
by Kallen – are aided by the experimental support of “responsible” scientists who count
themselves among the democratic faithful.
Mirsky’s vision of science that provides the means of transforming humans into
more suitable democratic citizens is not a curious exception among the scientific
participants at the conference, but a view shared by several others (all specially selected
for the occasion), including Richard M. Brickner, an Associate Professor of Clinical
Neurology at the College of Physicians and Surgeons. Brickner described his discovery
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as a practicing psychoanalyst that numerous apparently “normal” patients have
extraordinarily “primitive” qualities, including “death wishes and hatreds and urges to
aggression.”75 Psychotherapy brings these hidden pathologies to light, and, while
Brickner did not contend that these aggressions can be alleviated, he argued that the
awareness of their existence thereby alerts people to the imperative to avoid acting upon
them. Echoing the sentiments of Albert Mirsky, Brickner stated that “it does seem to
clear things up to know what is bothering you is that you are the same as a lion or a dog
or an ungentleable rat in some ways.” He concluded: “People get better, they get happier,
when they have been through such a course of education.”76
Again echoing Mirsky, Brickner argued that responsible scientists can offer their
expertise to improve democratic conditions. Specifically, Brickner proposed to prevent
the onset of adolescent disillusionment by forestalling the initial implantation of illusions
in young children. He insisted that he and other scientists should “teach some of the
principles we find useful in adult psychotherapy to children as a sort of prophylactic
psychotherapy.”77 As Mirsky suggested, wild rats cannot be easily “gentled,” but
laboratory rats, bred in captivity, and treated properly, can be conditioned to be gentle if
one begins from the point of birth. Similarly, “wild” humans can only with difficulty be
“gentled” by means of extensive psychiatric intervention; better to avoid this eventuality
by beginning gentling treatment from a very young age. As Mirsky argued, “genetically,
[the gentled rat] is quite a different animal. His inherent germ-plasm or whatever you
care to call it is different from that of the [wild] rats, and it really is impossible to gentle
his variety of rat.”78
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These proposed “democratic” applications of science appear to be a long way
from Bacon’s belief that science allowed the realization of the proud declaration that
humans are “not animals on their hind legs, but mortal gods.” Yet, if these expressions
of democratic science appear to reduce humanity to the level of “mere” animals –
laboratory rats – its aim is ultimately consistent with Bacon’s belief that purely material
amelioration, by means of inquiry into purely natural phenomenon, was the route to a
new form of divination (after all, Mirsky and Brickner each speak of the “gentled” rat as
a signal improvement over its naturally “wild” alternative, and Mirsky points to the
possibility of genetic improvement of the species). The linkage of this aim to a rarified
democratic faith makes explicit the attempt to universalize this outcome for all citizens,
to make common the transformation of imperfect creatures into – in Rorty’s words – “a
more evolved form of humanity,” made possible by the “principle means” of
democracy.79

Perilous Faith
Such thinkers are both keenly aware of the dangers of “faith,” on the one hand –
particularly a religious faith – and, on the other hand, the political pitfalls of faithlessness.
Faith is both dangerously absolutist in the one guise (especially religious faith), and
regarded as a requirement in order to maintain belief in a fully democratic future (a
“democratic faith”). The “democratic faithful,” however, are strikingly unwilling to
consider the potential dangers of their own “absolutism” even as they exhibit fierce
suspicion about any other “absolutist” claims, especially any forms of “absolutist” faith
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in the divine that may, in fact, offer more resources for the resistance of hubris and the
possibility of true humility than that “democratic faith” which they embrace.
Particularly because of “progressivist” assumptions that underlie pragmatic belief
in the “democratic faith” – assumptions about the positive results of technological
developments that are understood to increase human possibilities of communication and
“intelligence,” ranging from Dewey’s faith in the promise of the locomotive and
telegraph to Benjamin R. Barber’s faith in the promise of the incipient internet – the
“democratic faithful” are often keenly unaware of “unintended consequences” that may,
and often do, accompany these “developments.”80 Such “unintended consequences” may
undermine what are arguably necessary features of democracy (such as the civic trust that
may be undermined as a result of the “advances” in transportation and communication, an
effect often attributed to the anomic lifestyle that has resulted from an automobile and
internet culture), or may neglect the necessary conditions of a decent human life lived in
concert, rather than in competition, with nature.
One sees evidence of such overconfidence in the methodology of science
throughout Dewey’s work. Noting his indebtedness to Francis Bacon, Dewey wrote that
“scientific laws do not lie on the surface of nature. They are hidden, and must be wrested
from nature by an active and elaborate technique of inquiry.”81 The job of the modern,
and especially modern science – a realm of inquiry that extends to the human sciences
(such as political science) as well as to the natural sciences – is to extract the secrets of
nature by whatever means possible, even if these methods at times evoke ominous
overtones and disturbing consequences. Again echoing Bacon, Dewey revealed the
severity with which the modern scientist must approach his task:
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[he] must force the apparent facts of nature into forms different to those in
which they familiarly present themselves; and thus make them tell the
truth about themselves, as torture may compel an unwilling witness to
reveal what he has been concealing.82
Because technology is seen as wholly in the service of democratic ends, one often sees in
Dewey’s work a blithe unwillingness to acknowledge the ways technologies may in fact
serve ends that are, in the first instance, anti-democratic, and beyond, hostile to human
and natural ecology. It is at least curious that Dewey should have put so much faith in
the compatibility of scientific progress and democracy – having lived through decades in
which American social science demonstrated how “science” could be rendered altogether
hostile to democratic “faith” – and finally ironic inasmuch as it would be Dewey’s own
faith to which the social scientists would appeal as a way of limiting the implications of
their science. 83
Moreover, reflected in the embrace of infinitely revisable “warranted assertions”
and overweening confidence in the experimental approach to all questions of public
policy is a blithe oversight of the forms of irreplaceable natural and human costs that
such “experimentation” may and does entail. One can reasonably stipulate that a
significant portion of “experimentation” is done today in order to relieve humanity and
the global ecology of the negative consequences of previous experiments – some among
which, once implemented as a remedy, can be reasonably expected to have yet
unforeseen negative consequences – just as projects that are speculatively being
undertaken to “relieve the human estate” will in all likelihood themselves result in further
unforeseen negative consequences in one domain even as they ameliorate the human
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condition in another.84 Because all setbacks are in fact constructive from an experimental
viewpoint,and all consequences that result from progress allow for further improvement,
in the worldview of the democratic faithful there is little or no awareness of human and
natural implications of negative costs, the limitations imposed by “path dependency,” and
the intractableness of tragedy. The “democratic faithful” evince an unwillingness, or
inability, to see negative consequences of assumptions that underlie the embrace of
material and moral “progress” as part of the democratic faith.
This reflects a wider inability to acknowledge the presence of tragedy embedded
in democratic overconfidence – an acknowledgement that can make avoidance of tragic
consequences more likely.85 Richard Rorty, for one, speaks of modern belief in religion
and “truth” as a form of “poetry,” yet is strikingly incapable of discerning the cautionary
lessons from even poetry that he otherwise embraces. For example, echoing sentiments
in Emerson’s “American Scholar” address, Rorty contrasts the tired metaphysical
philosophy of Europe with the “new metaphysic” of democracy in the New World:
Just as Mark Twain was convinced that everything bad in European life
and society could be corrected by adopting American attitudes and
customs which is Connecticut Yankee brought to King Arthur’s Court, so
Dewey was convinced that everything that was wrong with traditional
European philosophy was the result of clinging to a world picture which
arose within, and met the needs of, an inegalitarian society.86
This is, to say the least, a surprising understanding of Twain’s novel from a professor of
Comparative Literature at Stanford University. While it is true that Hank Morgan, the
“Yankee,” skewers aristocratic and religious traditions in medieval England, by the end
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of the novel he proves to be more brutal and murderous than the knights he ridicules.
Using the technologies of the Gatling gun, modern explosives, and electricity generated
from coal, he succeeds in killing thirty-thousand of Arthur’s knights, and in the process
defeats himself as he and his band of modernist allies succumb to the pestilence that the
piled corpses create. Twain’s novel hardly stands as a morality tale about the corrupt
evils of Europe opposed to the decencies of America, but rather – in addition to deriding
the inequalities of English aristocratic society – even more fiercely condemns the smug
superiority of American optimism that refuses to see the ways that its own democratic
faith both overlooks, and may itself contain, seeds of inescapable human tragedy and
cruelty. In light of this oversight, Rorty’s sympathy for an “Americanized humanity” is
all the more alarming.87
“Democratic Faith” appropriately reflects a version of what philosopher Michael
Oakeshott called “The Politics of Faith” – a form of political “faith” notable for the
“absence of doubt” about itself, an unscrupulous belief “in the redemption of mankind in
history and by human effort” aimed at the “perfection of mankind” and informed by a
kind of “cosmic optimism.”88 Oakeshott contrasted this form of politics with “the
Politics of Scepticism,” a politics conducted under the assumption that humankind is not
capable of its own perfection, one notable for “prudent diffidence” rather than “radical
doubt,” one hesitant about the claims of political rule and wary of despotism created in
the name of progress or “the people.”89
What is striking in Oakeshott’s formulation is the extent to which those who
maintain the “Politics of Faith” almost unanimously attack “faith” in its religious form
(such as Machiavelli and Bacon – or, by extension, Dewey and Rorty), whereas those
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whom Oakeshott identifies as maintaining “the Politics of Scepticism” include religiously
“faithful” thinkers such as Augustine, Pascal, and Tocqueville.90 Whereas a pragmatic
form of faith, notably “democratic faith,” secures belief in an ever improving future, the
“politics of skepticism” is reinforced by the initial embrace of faith in redemption beyond
the wholly human or political that is in turn accompanied by insistence upon humility and
circumspection. Democracy may, in the end, require faith in some form, but it remains
contestable whether the “democratic faith” of pragmatism is finally the form of faith that
best serves the cause and prospects of democracy.
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